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Abstract
Research has shown that stigmatized
subjects, defined as members of groups
about which others hold negative attitudes,
receiving negative feedback from a
prejudiced evaluator attribute the nature of
the feedback to the source rather than to
their own performance. The purpose of
this experiment was to determine whether
this self-protective mechanism also occurs
in nonstigmatized individuals. Sixty-seven
subjects, male and female undergraduate
students enrolled at a small midwestern
liberal arts college, participated in a 2 x 2
between-subjects factorial design in which
the independent variable of evaluator
prejudice or nonprejudice was crossed with
stigmatized or nonstigmatized subject
status. Results of an ANOVA measuring
the difference between subjects' pre- and
postmanipulation esteem scores showed a
significant interaction between evaluator
prejudice and subject status (p = .009).
Nonstigmatized subjects' self-esteem was
elevated by receiving feedback from a
prejudiced evaluator and decreased by
receiving feedback from a nonprejudiced
evaluator. No esteem effects were found in
the stigmatized subjects. The results
showed that stigmatized subjects did not
feel the need to protect their self-esteem by
elevating their esteem score in the
prejudiced evaluator condition because they
were able to attribute the feedback to
evaluator prejudice.

According to Crocker and Major
(1989), stigmatized groups are "social
categories about which others hold
negative attitudes, stereotypes, and
beliefs..."(p. 609). There are several
conflicting interaction theories regarding
the effects that interactions with members
of nonstigmatized groups have on the
self-esteem of stigmatized group members.
These theories have been used to support
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one of two opposing ideas. The insulation
hypothesis is based on the idea that when
members of stigmatized groups interact
with members of nonstigmatized groups,
self-esteem of the stigmatized group
members declines. The second theory, the
contact hypothesis, states that the selfesteem of stigmatized group members will
not suffer, and may in some cases benefit,
from interactions with members of
nonstigmatized groups (Krause, 1983).
The insulation hypothesis is
supported by the self-fulfilling prophecy
theory (Merton, 1948), the symbolic
interactionist perspective (Cooley, 1956;
Mead, 1934), the contextual dissonance
effects theory (Rosenberg, 1977), and the
efficacy-based self-esteem theory (Gecas &
Schwalbe, 1983). Each of these positions
predicts stigmatized group members will
have lower self-esteem. The contact
hypothesis is supported by Weiner's
attributional analysis of emotion theory
(Weiner, 1985, 1986) and the reformulated
learned helplessness theory (Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). These
theories predict that members of
stigmatized groups will attribute failure and
rejection in mainstream society to prejudice
against their group. This external
attribution will protect their self-esteem by
placing the blame for personal failure on
others.
The theories and empirical evidence
that support both the insulation and contact
hypotheses will be discussed and critiqued.
Unless otherwise specified, when selfesteem is mentioned it refers to global selfesteem.
The theory of efficacy-based selfesteem states that members of stigmatized
groups suffer from decreased self-esteem
when they interact with members of
nonstigmatized groups (Gecas &
Schwalbe, 1983). According to this view,
self-esteem develops through successful
and nonsuccessful manipulations of the
environment. When someone is successful
in controlling and manipulating their
environment, they may see themselves as
competent, able, and powerful, resulting in
increased self-esteem. On the other hand,
when the individual's attempt to manipulate
the environment is blocked or inhibited in
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some way, as is often the case for
members of stigmatized groups, the
resulting frustration may cause feelings of
failure and lowered self-esteem. According
to Gecas and Schwalbe (1983), societal
conditions such as segregation and
discrimination against members of
stigmatized groups "can limit the
possibilities for the formation of efficacybased self-esteem by limiting access to
resources that are necessary for producing
intended effects" (p. 82).
In addition to this theory, ideas
such as equity theory (Adams, 1963),
social exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley,
1959), the self-fulfilling prophecy theory
(Merton, 1948), the symbolic interactionist
perspective (Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934),
and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,
1986) are also in line with the view that
social stigma has a negative effect on selfesteem. In fact, this idea has been so
widely accepted that, according to Crocker
and Major (1989), it has been accepted as
true. Allport (1954/1979) wrote that
"group oppression may destroy the
integrity of the ego entirely, and reverse its
normal pride, and create a groveling selfimage"(p. 152). Similarly, Erikson (1956)
stated, "There is ample evidence of
'inferiority' feelings and of morbid selfhate in all minority groups" (p. 155).
Despite the diverse theoretical
perspectives which predict that
membership in a stigmatized group will
result in diminished self-esteem, the
empirical evidence that supports these
theories is scarce, inadequate, or both. In
fact, recent research has come to the
opposite conclusion. Some data indicate
that members of some stigmatized groups
have levels of self-esteem equal to or
higher than that of members of
nonstigmatized groups. For example, a
large number of studies have come to the
conclusion that Blacks have levels of selfesteem equal to or higher than that of
Whites (Hoelter, 1982; Porter &
Washington, 1979; Rosenberg, 1979;
Wylie, 1979). Also, two extensive reviews
have concluded that women do not have
lower self-esteem than men (Macoby &
Jacklin, 1974; Wylie, 1979). Research has
also shown that members of many other

stigmatized groups do not suffer from
diminished self-esteem relative to members
of nonstigmatized groups (Crocker &
Major, 1989). In fact, according to
Crocker and Major, "this research,
conducted over a time span of more than
20 years, leads to the surprising conclusion
that prejudice against members of
stigmatized or oppressed groups generally
does not result in lowered self-esteem for
members of those groups" (p. 611). They
further state that "these findings generalize
across a variety of stigmatizing conditions,
a variety of measures of global self-esteem,
and a wide range of subject populations"
(p. 611).
In some cases, gaps in empirical
evidence of the theories of the
insulationists can explain discrepancies.
For example, Rosenberg (1977) states that
members of stigmatized groups are often
subject to either racial, ethnic, or sexual
slurs, or all three. He fails to provide any
evidence, however, that these slurs are
internalized and incorporated into the selfconcept. If, on the other hand, members of
stigmatized groups are able to resist
integration of the dominant groups'
perceptions into their self-concept, they
may be able to simply dismiss these
dissonant communications. According to
Krause's (1983) research, this seems to be
the process that occurs. In his attempt to
replicate Rosenberg and Simmon's (1972)
study of Black students' self-esteem,
Krause was unable to find any significant
effect of racial teasing on the self-esteem of
Black students at any grade level.
Rosenberg (1977) also states that
people compare themselves to those around
them in order to develop their self-concept,
an idea in line with Festinger's (1954)
theory of social comparison. He states that
empirical research shows that people do
not compare themselves with any other,
but rather with a comparable other.
Festinger posits that when members of
stigmatized groups are immersed within the
majority culture, they will compare
themselves with those of the majority, and
hence, feel inferior or powerless.
However, he did not provide any evidence
of this, nor was he able to show that
Blacks have lower self-esteem than
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Whites. It may be that members of
stigmatized groups compare themselves
with members of their own groups rather
than with out-group members. This point
is supported by the research of Verkuyten
(1988). In a study of Black and White
Dutch youths, Verkuyten found that the
White youths (members of that society's
nonstigmatized group) felt that friends and
teachers were relevant comparison people,
while Black youths felt that only their
family members were significant for
comparisons.
In addition to modifying the above
mentioned ideas to fit the empirical
evidence, researchers have used other
psychological theories to explain why
members of stigmatized groups do not
have lower self-esteem than members of
nonstigmatized groups. For example,
Weiner's (1985, 1986) attributional
analysis of emotion theory and the
reformulated learned helplessness theory
(Abramson et al., 1978) give plausible
explanations for the undiminished selfesteem of members of stigmatized groups.
According to these theories, internal
attributions for positive outcomes and
external attributions for negative outcomes
lead to increased self-esteem. Empirical
evidence generally supports this point (e.g.
Crocker, Alloy, & Kayne, 1988; Weiner &
Lerman, 1978, 1979). Because prejudice
against one's group is an external
attribution for a negative outcome this
attribution should protect, and in fact
enhance, the self-esteem of a stigmatized
person.
Crocker and Major (1989), in an
extensive review of the literature, proposed
the above point of an attributional defense
mechanism, and two others, as
"mechanisms that buffer the self-esteem of
members of stigmatized or oppressed
groups from the prejudice of others" (p.
612). The second mechanism cited by
Crocker and Major states members of
stigmatized groups may protect their selfesteem through selective comparisons
between their own outcomes and those of
members of their own group. Festinger
(1954) states that "the tendency to compare
oneself with some other specific person
decreases as the difference between his
38

opinion or ability and one's own increases"
(p. 120).
Crocker and Major (1989) suggest
that members of stigmatized groups are
more likely to make in-group comparisons
for three reasons: (a) a proximity effect, (b)
a similarity effect, and (c) a self-protective
effect. With respect to the proximity effect,
in-group social comparisons are due to the
fact that members of the ingroup will often
be more prevalent in one's immediate
environment. With regard to the similarity
effect, it has been found that people
compare their living standards and social
status with those whose situations are
similar to their own (Singer, 1981). In
fact, preference for comparing oneself with
similar others is so strong that it has been
shown to dominate proximal comparisons
when people are surrounded by their
outgroups (Crosby, 1982; Rosow, 1974;
Strauss, 1968). The third way in which
members of stigmatized groups may
protect their self-esteem is by selectively
devaluing the dimensions on which their
group performs poorly and selectively
valuing those dimensions on which their
group fares well (Crocker & Major, 1989).
This idea is based on the premise that if a
certain dimension is not centrally important
to an individual, then failure on that
dimension will not lower the person's selfesteem (Harter, 1986; Rosenberg, 1979;
Rosenberg & Simmons, 1972).
It was hypothesized that the four
groups in this study should differ in how
they reacted to negative feedback and the
extent to which they internalized it.
Specifically, participants in the stigmatized/
prejudiced evaluator condition would show
the least change between pretest and
posttest self-esteem scores because they
would attribute the negative feedback to
external factors, rather than to their own
performances. It was also predicted that
participants in the nonstigmatized/
prejudiced evaluator condition would show
a slight decrease in self-esteem because,
although they had reason to attribute the
negative feedback externally, they would
not have had as much practice doing it as
the members of the stigmatized groups,
and therefore they would not be as efficient
in externalizing feedback. Participants in
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the other two conditions were predicted to
show equivalent decreases in self-esteem,
greater than those of participants in the
nonstigmatized/prejudiced evaluator
condition, because they had no external
sources for which to attribute their failures.
Method

Participants
Sixty-seven undergraduate male
and female students currently enrolled at a
midwestern liberal arts college who were
registered in psychology classes during the
Spring term of 1994 participated in this
experiment. Participants received extra
credit towards their final grade for
participating.

Design
This experiment utilized a 2 x 2
between-subjects factorial design. The ex
post facto variables were gender, and the
two levels were male and female. The other
independent variable, with two levels, was
a prejudiced or nonprejudiced evaluator, as
conveyed by an attitude survey. The
dependent variable was changes in global
self-esteem levels as measured by the
Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale.

Materials
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale
was used to measure subjects' global selfesteem levels. The attitude survey used
expressed the fictitious evaluators'
opinions on several different topics,
including male and female gender role
issues. This survey contained five
questions pertaining to attitudes towards
women and five questions pertaining to
attitudes towards men. Responses to all
questions were given on a five-point scale,
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5
(strongly disagree). Subjects received one
of three different attitude surveys from
their fictitious evaluators which showed the
evaluator as being prejudiced against
women, prejudiced against men, or neutral
on issues of gender. All subjects received
the same negative evaluation from the
fictitious evaluator stating that the
participant knew little about affirmative

action, and that the essay the participant
wrote was poorly written and missed many
arguments.

Procedure
Participants were asked by either
their instructor or the experimenter to
participate in a two-part experiment which
was being conducted as part of a Senior
Honors Project. Subjects completed the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the first part
of the experiment, at least five days prior to
participation in the second part of the
experiment. At this time, they also
scheduled a half-hour appointment to
complete the second part of the experiment.
They were told that they would receive
extra credit in exchange for participation in
both parts of the study.
During the second part of the
experiment, subjects were put into a small
room with only a desk, a computer, and a
printer, and asked to complete a short
attitude survey. They were then told that
their attitude surveys would be shown to
their partners in the experiment, and that
they too would be allowed to see their
partner's attitude survey. After completing
the attitude survey, subjects were given
instructions to type their gender and an
essay on the computer describing their
opinions on affirmative action. The
instructions stated that their essays were to
be evaluated by their partner (who was
actually fictitious) based on the strength,
clarity, and number of their arguments.
Subjects were told they had 10 min to
complete their essays and not to worry
about spelling or punctuation because it
was not a factor in the experiment. They
were instructed to express as many
arguments, both for and against their
position, rather than focus on one or two
arguments in great detail. Subjects were
also told that they would evaluate the essay
of the (fictitious) person who was
evaluating them.
After the 10-min time limit elapsed,
the experimenter returned and printed out
the essay. The experimenter explained that
the subject's essay would be evaluated first
and that as soon as the subject's partner
had evaluated his or her essay, the
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experimenter would return with the
evaluation and give the subject a chance to
read it. Subjects were told that the
experimenter would then return and give
them the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.
Subjects were told that this would help
them to focus more on themselves and less
on the essay or evaluation, so that they
could evaluate their partner's essay with an
open mind. The experimenter then sealed
each subject's attitude survey and essay in
an envelope and asked the subject to write
a number across the seal so that they would
be identified only by number and not by
name. The experimenter then gave each
subject the attitude survey of their fictitious
partner to look at while they waited for
their essay to be evaluated.
In the prejudiced evaluator
condition, this attitude survey expressed
negative attitudes towards each subject's
gender, while it expressed positive
attitudes regarding the opposite gender,
thus giving the subjects the impression that
their evaluator was prejudiced against the
subject's gender. In the nonprejudiced
evaluator condition, the attitude survey
showed neutral attitudes on all issues of
gender. Subjects were then left alone for 7
min to give them ample time to read the
fictitious subject's attitude survey. After 7
min had elapsed, the experimenter returned
with a computer printout of the evaluator's
critique of the subjects' essay. All
evaluations were negative, citing poor
clarity with few arguments. All essays
were judged as generally nonpersuasive.
The experimenter then left for 3
min while the subjects read the evaluations.
The experimenter then returned with the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale for the
subject to complete, explaining again that
this would help control for the effects that
their present mood, positive or negative,
would have on the evaluation of the
fictitious subject's essay. After completion
of this item, subjects were asked if they
had any suspicions about the experiment.
Those whose suspicions were such that
they did not believe they had a partner in
the experiment, or that the evaluation of
their essay was not from their partner were
noted for possible exclusion from the data
set. Subjects were then fully debriefed and
40

given back their unopened essays and
attitude surveys.
Results
Eighteen of the subjects' data were
eliminated from the analysis because it was
determined during debriefing that they
were aware of the hypothesis of the
experiment, or were suspicious that they
had not been paired with a real partner.
This was done to avoid the possibility that
their behavior was influenced by demand
characteristics, which would contaminate
the results. The following is a breakdown
of how many subjects' data were
eliminated from each group: female/
prejudiced = 4, female/nonprejudiced = 3,
male/prejudiced = 6, male/nonprejudiced =
5. The final number of subjects used for
data analysis was 49.
A two-way ANOVA was used to
analyze the difference scores of subjects'
self-esteem before and after the
manipulation. No significant main effects
for subject stigmatization status or
evaluator prejudice were detected.
However, a significant interaction between
the two variables of subject gender and
stigmatization status was obtained, F(1,
48) = 7.42, p = .009. The mean difference
scores in the four experimental conditions
showed that nonstigmatized subjects who
received feedback from a prejudiced
evaluator displayed the highest increase in
self-esteem scores (M = 3.33), whereas
receiving feedback from a nonprejudiced
evaluator resulted in decreased self-esteem
for the nonstigmatized subjects (M =
-1.36). Follow-up comparisons using the
Tukey HSD test revealed that the only
significant difference existed between the
mean scores for nonstigmatized subjects (q
= 4.25). No significant difference existed
for stigmatized subjects receiving feedback
from a prejudiced evaluator (M = .36) or a
nonprejudiced evaluator (M = 1.27).
Four separate t-tests were
computed to ascertain whether the changes
in self-esteem in the four different
conditions differed significantly from zero
(i.e. if a mean of -1.36 actually indicated a
drop in self-esteem). None of the t-tests
showed significance in any of the cell
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means. However, in the nonstigmatizedprejudiced evaluator condition a value of
t(8) = 1.92, p = .09 was obtained.
Discussion
The analysis revealed a significant
difference between the change scores of
nonstigmatized subjects. This could be due
to the possibility that when nonstigmatized
individuals received negative feedback
which they determined to be unfair due to
the prejudiced nature of the evaluator, they
saw the second administration of the selfesteem test as a legitimate opportunity to
reaffirm their self-concepts, and thus
inflated their self-esteem scores. However,
having no external source to attribute the
negative feedback too, those subjects in the
nonprejudiced evaluator condition seemed
to have internalized the feedback into their
self-concepts, as evidenced by the
significant difference between their change
scores and those of their counterparts.
The post hoc comparisons of
means did not reveal a significant
difference between the change scores of the
stigmatized subjects. Although only one
group could attribute the negative feedback
to evaluator prejudice, it appears as though
both groups were able to discount it. One
possibility for this is that stigmatized
individuals may be so accustomed to
attributing negative feedback to external
sources and then discounting it, that they
do so even when these external attributions
are unwarranted.
Women in the prejudiced evaluator
condition showed the smallest change selfesteem scores (.36) between the first test
and the second test. Also, men in the
prejudiced evaluator condition showed the
largest increase in self-esteem scores
(3.33). However, neither of these score
changes were found to be significant.
Surprisingly, the men and women in the
nonprejudiced evaluator condition showed
almost exactly opposite responses to the
negative feedback they received. The men
showed an average decrease in self-esteem
scores of 1.36, while the women showed
an average increase of 1.27. Neither of
these scores were significant.
Since none of the means of the

difference scores differed significantly
from zero, it appears that no group of
subjects was significantly impacted by the
negative feedback that they received on
their essay-writing task. The failure to
obtain significant results in these cells
appears to be partly due to flaws in the
study. Significant values might have been
achieved if two conditions had been
present. First, if more subjects had
participated in the study, the degrees of
freedom in each cell would have been
higher thus increasing the statistical power
to detect an effect. If this were the case, the
trends in subject responses may have
continued, and significant changes in selfesteem may have been seen in all of the
cells except for the stigmatized/prejudiced
evaluator condition.
Also, if directional rather than nondirectional hypotheses were posed, a onetailed test rather than two-tailed t-test could
have been computed, cutting the
probability in half. In the two
nonstigmatized conditions, this change
would have yielded a probability of .06 for
the nonprejudiced evaluator condition and a
probability of .045 for the prejudiced
evaluator condition. Coupled together, it
appears that these two problems were
partly responsible for the failure to achieve
significant results in three of the t-tests,
which would have been in line with this
hypothesis, as well as the contact
hypothesis. Support was shown for the
contact hypothesis because interactions
between stigmatized individuals (females)
and nonstigmatized individuals (prejudiced
evaluators) did not cause the self-esteem of
the stigmatized persons to decrease.
Despite strong theoretical support,
the idea that stigmatization causes lowered
self-esteem is not supported empirically.
The counter-intuitive notion that
stigmatization may, in fact, lead to equal or
higher levels of self-esteem seems to be
well supported both theoretically and
empirically. Although stigmatization
certainly has negative effects on many life
areas, self-esteem does not appear to be
one of them. It may be that when
stigmatized people expect to fail and do,
they are able to cope well with their failure.
When they expect to succeed and do, the
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results also may not greatly affect their
self-esteem. However, when stigmatized
group members expect to fail and yet they
succeed, they may benefit from a large
boost in self-esteem. This extra boost may,
in turn, help them be more resilient against
the forces of prejudice and discrimination,
and thus help them to be more satisfied
with themselves.
Future studies should attempt to
determine whether the failure to achieve
significant results was due to the above
mentioned design flaws or because the
hypothesized effect does not exist. This
could be done by increasing the number of
participants in the study, and thus
increasing the degrees of freedom, and by
using a one-tailed rather than two-tailed ttest. Another interesting study would
involve determining exactly what the
subjects attributed the negative evaluations
to. A study of this sort would help to
clarify the differences, similarities, or both
that exist between stigmatized and
nonstigmatized individuals in whether they
attribute failure to either external or internal
factors. Finally, an additional
methodological consideration is to maintain
concealment of the hypothesis from the
subjects so as to avoid biased data that will
have to be eliminated.
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